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ABSTRACT: Starting with a debate in September 2012 on the incorporation of 
domestic violence as a distinct offence in Hungary’s new Criminal Code, the 
issue of gender and proper womanhood has regularly re-surfaced in statements 
made by ruling coalition MPs in parliamentary debates. Drawing on discourse 
analysis, this study investigates a selection of these statements in the context of 
the government’s current policy and public discourse. The paper argues that 
these discourses outline an essentialist model reflective of a dominant ideology 
that is traditional, Christian, patriarchal and heteronormative, which, by hinting 
at women’s accountability for certain social ills, also allows for a chain of 
associations that ultimately results in the subversion of the overall social status 
of women, dividing and marginalising them further and discrediting any claims 
or actions aimed at establishing a more egalitarian society in the country.  
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The Hungarian Government and Its Policies 
 
In the 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary, over two-
thirds of the seats were won by the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic 
Alliance and their election partner, the Christian Democratic 
People’s Party (KDNP). Consequently, the two parties were entitled 
to form a coalition government, one which is often described as 
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centre-right on the political spectrum. While the political position 
and ideology of the current government has been characterised in 
a variety of ways, such as the Hungarian “New Right” with a 
mixed ideology (Bozoki), “Christian and nationalist” (Tartakoff), 
“the conservative third way” (Péterváry), “Christian socialist” 
(Méltányosság) and the “mafia state” or “octopus state” for its 
putative long reach (Magyar et al.), it is important to point out 
some of the specific features of the government’s policy that may 
account for such a wide range of interpretations. 
The FIDESZ-KDNP government can indeed be regarded as 
conservative, nationalistic and Christian in terms of the social 
and cultural values it represents. On the other hand, it also 
displays a particular animosity towards the free market economy 
and towards business sectors typically regarded as relatively 
profitable, such as banking, and foreign/Western capital 
represented in Hungary by large multinationals. Hence, a 
tendency to expand central government control—which is often 
coupled with state ownership—of particular segments of the 
economy has strengthened since the government assumed power. 
Moreover, pronounced political domination over Hungarian 
culture, the media, the education system and numerous other 
areas has evoked in many, especially among the older 
generations, memories of governing practices under socialism.1 
These actions signify an increasing political objective of 
normalising, regulating and controlling the whole of society as 
well as boosting the overall power and authority of the 
government and its close allies centred on the authoritative figure 
of the Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. 
As in some other parliamentary systems, because the political 
party or parties that win a parliamentary election are also entitled 
to form the new government in Hungary, members of which are 
usually also MPs themselves, there is no strict separation of the 
legislative and executive powers. This is particularly the case 
when MPs are encouraged to form a solid bloc and vote first and 
foremost along party lines, a common state of affairs since the 
regime change in 1990. The current government, with firm 
support from coalition MPs, made use of its legislative power and 
replaced the country’s constitution with a new document called 
                          
1 In a heated parliamentary debate, the Prime Minister even stated: “In the 
eighties, I was not fighting against dictatorship; I was fighting against those who 
were doing [sic!] dictatorship” (Szalay). 
The Dominant Discourse on Proper Womanhood in the Hungarian Parliament 
 
7 
the Fundamental Law, which went into force on January 1, 2012. 
Forced through Parliament by a two-thirds majority of the ruling 
coalition, the new Law was not based on an overall social 
consensus and thus was received with serial criticism. One  
such criticism was concerned with the institutionalisation of 
heteronormativity and the unambiguous preference for traditional 
gender roles expressed through the definition of marriage and 
family in Article L, in the section entitled Foundation: 
(1) Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision 
and the family as the basis of the nation’s survival. Marriage and 
parent-child relations provide the basis for a family.2 
(2) Hungary shall encourage the commitment to have children (7). 
The sense of social conservatism and a Christian value system 
is captured further in Article II, in the section entitled Freedom 
and Responsibility: “Human dignity shall be inviolable. Every 
human being shall have the right to life and human dignity; 
embryonic and foetal life shall be subject to protection from the 
moment of conception” (11). Although leading politicians in the 
ruling coalition have claimed that this statement merely carries 
symbolic significance, the Ministry of Human Resources since 
then has funded various programmes towards this end, such as a 
controversial pro-life campaign launched by the Agota Foundation. 
Through its executive power, the government has also taken 
certain measures and implemented various programmes to 
achieve these objectives. These have included the introduction of 
family taxation, which offers significant tax deductions to “large 
families,” which are defined as those with three or more children. 
The demographic programme passed in 2013 was primarily 
designed to encourage natural population growth through various 
types of benefit and support granted to families, such as a new 
system of housing support and more favourable conditions for 
maternity leave. The regulation of abortion3 represents another 
example of state interference in this regard in the private affairs of 
citizens and in the medical profession in general. These examples 
illustrate that through the Law and its execution, Christian 
                          
2 The second sentence was added in spring 2013, the fourth time the Law 
was amended. 
3 Currently, abortion is legal in Hungary under certain conditions. A recent 
addendum to the issue was the status of the abortion pill, which was passed in 
May 2012, and then, within two weeks, the decision was rescinded as a result of 
a parliamentary debate initiated by the Christian Democrats. 
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conservative norms and ideas have increasingly become the 
legally binding reality for every citizen living within the borders of 
Hungary. 
 
 
Public Governmental Discourse 
 
The coalition has made apt use of its access to media 
channels to develop a public discourse in support of its value-
system and policy, part of which regards the social role and 
position of women. Fairclough sees “discourses as ways of 
representing aspects of the world . . . associated with the different 
relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on their 
positions in the world” (124). Moreover, drawing on Fairclough, 
Baker and Galasinski emphasise that “discourse is constitutive of 
and constituted by social and political realities,” (65) which are 
confirmed by means of power expressive of ideologies that are 
underlying “structures of signification” (66). They conclude that 
the study of discourse is thus a useful tool to “reveal the 
ideological framings of discursive practices,” (25) to which this 
study also hopes to contribute. 
The Hungarian government has developed a series of 
discursive strategies to contextualise, argue and justify its 
policies. It has ensured wide dissemination of these through the 
regulation, centralisation and government control of the media. In 
the government’s public communication, certain tropes, such as 
family, nation, danger, attack, independence, defence and 
success, have surfaced regularly, with shifts in meaning, foci and 
relevance (Szabó 2007). I argue that the family, defined as the 
“basis for the nation’s survival” (Fundamental Law 7), occupies a 
key position in this matrix of signifiers.  
Foucault points out the importance of the family in modernity, 
in particular in the politics of emerging nation-states. He argues 
that, as of the mid-eighteenth century, governments have started 
to rely on the family as an exceptional tool of governance since 
they realised that “certain factors within the population, such as 
sexual behaviour, demographics, the number of children or 
consumption can be accessed only through the family” (119). 
Political power, therefore, has come to politicise the presumably 
private, familial space to shape and govern the nation, aiming to 
determine family matters and thus gender roles on the basis of 
government interests (Collins, Strach). 
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I emphasise that the family as an institution is not only 
central to governing, but also to constructing the nation as a 
unique and sovereign group of people. This phenomenon is not 
exclusive to Hungary, but is shared in varying degrees among 
nation-states that have located ethnicity at the core of their 
national consciousness. In his study of the constitution of nation-
states, Smith distinguishes between “two models and trajectories 
of nation formation, the civic-territorial and the ethnic-
genealogical,” (4) of which Hungary is characterised by the latter. 
I consider ethnicity as “instrumental” (Smith 9) in the symbolic 
construction of Hungarian national identity in numerous ways, 
the most important segment of which for the current discussion  
is that the “‘ethnicity’ of a community . . . presupposes the 
uniformity and antiquity of its origins, as a result of which it may 
be viewed as a natural grouping and its characteristics as 
inherent in the population” (Greenfeld 13). Indeed, as captured by 
Bátory’s definition of Hungarian identity as a “kin-state identity,” 
central to the construction of Hungarian national identity is the 
consciousness of shared ethnic origin: it places the existence of 
the community in a historical continuum based on common blood 
descent and therefore constructing the image of Hungarians as a 
naturally evolving, authentic group defined though kinship, and 
not as a political or cultural “invention” (Sollors, Hobsbawm) or 
“imagined community” (Anderson). 
The concept of nationhood constructed through that of 
ethnicity is inherently structured along gender lines: authors 
such as Domosh and Seager (160-167), McDowell (44-50), Rose  
(66-77) and Yuval-Davis (1-6, 25-29) discuss various ways in 
which the rhetorical construction of ethnicity rests on the  
notion of biological reproduction and thus of motherhood. This 
understanding throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries became culturally embedded in the feminisation of 
religion (Putney 7, 74-76, DeRogatis 211-212, Marsden 83-84), in 
which a relevant conceptual shift was indicated by modelling 
modern womanhood on the example of the Virgin Mary and 
sacred motherhood (DeRogatis 211)—a shift which also found its 
way to Hungary, where it prevailed well into the twentieth century 
(Balogh).  
In terms of social structure, modernity advocated the model of 
the nuclear family for a middle class emerging through expansive 
industrialisation. The model became widespread in Europe and 
the US throughout the 19th century, marked by the separation of 
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the private and public spheres and specific, accentuated gender 
roles that placed women in the domestic realm, primarily as wives 
and mothers (Marsh 21-32). A true woman, according to this 
model, was expected to have “four cardinal virtues—piety, purity, 
submissiveness and domesticity,” of which “piety was the core  
of woman’s virtue, the source of her strength” (Welter 152). 
Paradoxically, while these virtues were expected to keep women in 
the private realm, the logic and arguments to justify it also 
stimulated the birth of the first women’s movements and 
organisations, thus contributing to the emergence of a powerful 
social conscience, public presence and voice for women (Kelly), a 
phenomenon that also characterized Hungary even during the 
first half of the 20th century (Sipos). 
The current Hungarian government, by focusing on 
nationhood conflated with ethnicity and thus endowing it with the 
notions of an inherently shared identity and culture, has 
succeeded in creating a populist discourse aimed at evoking an 
emotional unity and solidarity among the population, to which its 
policies in general can easily be appended. In order to heighten 
the sense of solidarity and constitute its own position as the sole 
power that can lead the nation, the government has also engaged 
in discourses of fear. I argue that this rhetoric is in line with the 
type of discourse Calhoun characterises as features of 
governments that are suspicious of globalisation. He concludes 
that one pronounced feature of such a discourse is that these 
nations “are generally presented in terms of inherited identities 
and solidarities in need of defence” (147). In the case of Hungary, 
a culture of fear is imposed upon the population through 
government discourse that relies heavily on the rhetoric of war—a 
feature that has historically figured in the construction of 
Hungarian nationhood because of the series of wars it had to 
engage in to achieve independent statehood (Kiss).  
The current government’s messages regularly reiterate that 
the Hungarian nation is under attack, both foreign and domestic. 
It is argued that the European Union presents a foreign  
political danger to the nation, while the IMF, foreign investors, 
multinationals and banks pose an economic threat. Since the 
government discursively identifies itself with the nation, every 
Hungarian critic of government practices is constituted as a 
domestic enemy of the nation (Szabó 129). This type of discourse 
not only heightens the emotional zeal among the people, but it 
also positions the government rhetorically in a military context: 
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Hungarians have been regularly hearing that their nation is in 
danger and that the government, engaged in a successful war of 
independence, represents the force that has managed to and will 
continue to defend Hungarians from these attacks. Furthermore, 
with a recent shift in the discourse, it is no longer merely 
Hungarian people that are being defended, but Hungarian 
families. 
This introduction of the familial into the discourse of fear 
highlights further gender-related implications that the discourse 
of militarisation itself evokes. In her study of gendering ideologies 
and practices in Israel, for example, Berkovitch has found that 
the “environmental threat” (Sanday, quoted in Berkovitch 616) 
has increased “the masculine ethos” (606) in society, while 
confirming Israeli motherhood as the national mission through 
which women could be mobilised and incorporated into the state 
as citizens. In Hungary, the rhetoric of war framed by a series  
of perceived threats has created a culture of fear and/or 
uncertainty, which is rounded out by further concerns about 
negative demographic changes in the form of an aging and 
shrinking population.4 While mobility has also contributed to this 
problem—indeed, the number of Hungarians that have migrated 
from the country is estimated to be around half a million,  
a significant number in a country of fewer than 10 million 
inhabitants—government communication still emphasises the 
need for natural reproduction, targeting women first and foremost 
to contribute to this imperative national project. All these indicate 
that concepts around which government discourse is structured, 
such as nation, family, attack and danger, not only overlap, but 
are loaded in terms of gender, conveying a message that locates 
the social significance of women in their role as mothers, while 
positioning them within a traditional gender hierarchy as well. 
 
 
Parliamentary Discourse on Women 
 
This rhetorical construction of women’s role is echoed in a 
selection of statements made by ruling coalition MPs during 
parliamentary sessions. The main set of excerpts to be discussed 
                          
4 According to Hungary’s National Census of 2011, the average number of 
children per family was 1.3, marriage rates were declining, only 44% of the 
population lived in families, etc. 
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is taken from a parliamentary debate on the legal status of 
domestic violence (Fábián) that took place on 10 September 2012. 
The issue was placed on the docket as a result of a civil initiative: 
in response to Parliament’s5 original refusal to recognise domestic 
violence—usually referred to in Hungarian as “violence within the 
family”—as a distinct offence, over one hundred thousand 
signatures were collected to demand its incorporation into the 
new Criminal Code. Reflective of the importance that the 
governing parties assigned to the matter, the discussion was 
scheduled for 3 a.m. This met with opposition outrage, as an 
outcome of which it was moved up to 9.30 p.m. Only seven MPs 
were present from the ruling parties, but the following words from 
one of them, István Varga,6 were sufficient to immediately stir up 
a heated debate: “Maybe mothers should go back to mainly 
raising children, and maybe they should be primarily concerned 
about having not just one or two, but three, or rather four or five 
children in this society. Then we’d have a reason to respect each 
other more, and domestic violence wouldn’t even come up.” 
The first sentence reflects the MP’s identification with the logic 
of the Fundamental Law: if domestic violence is violence within 
the family, which is defined by law as a social group with parents 
and a child or children, then the female adult member of the 
family is by definition a mother. This lays the groundwork for the 
upcoming discourse that reflects and confirms traditional, 
essentialist approaches to gender roles. Accordingly, female 
representation in his discourse is achieved through the function 
of motherhood—something the MP seems to assess on the basis 
of the number of live births a woman has given. His reductionism, 
on the one hand, reflects the typically gendered nature of 
discourse on the topic of children in Hungary as far as it tends to 
be connected to women, both as a biological process as well as a 
social and cultural responsibility (Joó). The sentence suggests 
that having children is solely a matter of women’s free will and 
choice: no reference is made to men—as if they either had no 
responsibility in the matter or performed their duties par 
                          
5 In the 2010 elections, only 9% of parliamentary seats were won by women. 
They comprised 8% of the FIDESZ-Christian Democrat coalition, 8% the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, 4% of the far right nationalist Jobbik party, and 31% 
of the centre-left, green liberal party Politics Can Be Different (LMP).  
6 A member of FIDESZ, he is the 60-year-old father of five children. His 
marital status is unclear. 
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excellence—nor to any social, economic, health-related or other 
factors that may also be considered in planning children.  
Implied in this sentence is women’s responsibility for the 
negative demographic change: the decreasing number of births 
and the resultant shrinking of the Hungarian population. 
Although the MP is unclear about the number of children a 
proper woman is expected to have, he is hinting at giving birth to 
at least three, but preferably more children. This ambiguity may 
be understood either as granting the freedom to determine the 
number of children one wishes to have beyond three or as an 
intentional vagueness. The informational gap in the discourse 
may also provide the government with the freedom to change their 
expectations, thus leaving women—discursively constituted as 
solely responsible for the number of children they have—in a state 
of permanent self-doubt about their performance as birth givers.7 
This vagueness, however, also contributes to the confirmation 
of patriarchal power within the family, creating a faulty and 
highly simplified logic based on which domestic violence cannot 
be regarded as a crime but as a familial act for which women—as 
inappropriate mothers—may be held responsible. This is achieved 
by a logical twist introduced through the concept of respect. The 
excerpt hints at the gendered nature of violence within the family, 
which is typically committed against women. Women as potential 
victims, however, become constituted as potential perpetrators in 
this discourse: they give birth to children, the number of which is 
found insufficient by the husband, as a result of which he is 
justified in not respecting her and thus in expressing his 
dissatisfaction in the form of violence.  
The social responsibility among women for certain problems 
has since then been implied in other parliamentary debates as 
well. Almost exactly a year later, for example, Parliament was 
discussing the problem of homeless people and their visibility in 
frequented public spaces. One of the Christian Democrat MPs, 
Tamás Lukács,8 unexpectedly referred back to the debate on 
domestic violence when he argued as follows: “When, as a result 
of outside pressure or pressure from other groups, we work on a 
law on domestic violence, we do not realise that we are passing 
                          
7 This is especially interesting as one of the most famous slogans used by 
Viktor Orbán offered a clear understanding of the model family in 2000: “Two 
parents, three rooms, three children, four wheels.” 
8 Aged 63, with 5 children, he heads the parliamentary Human Rights 
Committee.  
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laws to solve a problem and, in doing so, create another problem, 
and thus we stand here surprised that we have the problem of 
homeless people . . . I braved a homeless shelter, where the story 
told by 8 out of 10 men started with: ‘when I got a divorce . . . ’. Is 
no one responsible for this?” 
Through a series of conflations and often unfounded 
associations, he seemed to imply that civil society was wrong to 
pressure Parliament to consider domestic violence as a legal 
offence; that the debate over the recognition of domestic violence 
as an offence accounted for some divorce cases; and that  
the majority of homeless people were men who, in their 
autobiographical narratives, identified divorce as the initial 
reason for their current state. The MP was ultimately blaming civil 
society activists, mainly women, and victims of domestic violence 
filing for divorce, primarily women, for homelessness in the 
country. The act of assigning collective blame to women is solely 
grounded in his personal experience and not in research findings 
or specific studies of the issue, which is a recurring feature of 
statements made by ruling coalition MPs in heated debates.  
During the discussion on domestic violence, Varga’s words 
stirred up fervent reactions from certain opposition MPs—of 
whom three were women—in response to which Varga clarified his 
position: “The most important calling for women, ladies, especially 
young ladies, is to have children. Besides this, naturally, once 
everyone has given birth to two, three or four children and has 
given enough to the homeland and everyone is happy, and [sic!] 
afterwards everyone can fulfil herself and must work at different 
places . . . The birth rate is the lowest in Hungary. Women have 
forgotten about giving birth while they were busy with getting 
emancipated.” He not only confirmed his position that 
childbearing lies at the heart of proper womanhood, but through 
a more refined choice of words he attached it to the culturally 
loaded, old-fashioned word for “ladies” as opposed to the more 
generic “women.” In his statement, motherhood functions as the 
social construction through which women can contribute to the 
nation, like a gendered duty of citizenship, as well as a source of 
happiness. Varga defined motherhood as a calling, a spiritual and 
moral responsibility of a higher degree, that enjoys primacy in the 
lives of proper women, to which paid employment must remain 
secondary. At this point, however, he briefly shifted into a register 
reflective of a more egalitarian language use, referring to work as 
fulfilment for women, as if leaving motherhood out of the 
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equation. In the last sentence, however, he returned to his 
original logic, presenting female emancipation in opposition to 
motherhood and thus to proper womanhood. Additionally, since 
women are able to contribute to the success of the nation as 
mothers, the last sentence by extension also implies that women 
concerned primarily with self-fulfilment and gender equality fail to 
serve the nation in their proper capacity. 
Another coalition MP, Ottó Karvalics,9 lent a political 
dimension to the debate when he argued as follows: “A faulty 
education system and a female visibility in the negative sense 
have brought it [violence] into the family.” The education system 
to which he referred resulted from a series of educational reforms 
introduced under previous, primarily leftist and liberal 
governments, whose parties are currently in the opposition. In 
order to correct the perceived shortcomings of this system, the 
present government, once it had assumed power, initiated a 
reconstruction of public education, which included changing the 
curriculum for some subjects and introducing ethics or morality 
as compulsory. The statement thus also forms part of the 
discourse that justifies these interventions in the education 
system. 
István Szávay,10 a member of the right-wing nationalist Jobbik 
party, expressed his support of coalition views in his statement, 
which also illustrates the cultural logic and gendered pattern of 
masculine language use: “I did not want to say anything, but 
Katalin Ertsey11 has simulated my adrenalin level, so I must 
speak up … [I]n the midst of the great defence of women’s rights, 
in the fight for equal rights, their message has often slipped into 
hatred of men, into the expression of some kind of female 
superiority.” The conflation of the protection of women’s rights 
and the struggle towards a more egalitarian society with a sense 
of female superiority and hatred towards men is an increasingly 
common discursive practice aimed at undermining advocates of 
women’s equality and discrediting any activism, political or 
professional discourse that point outs shortcomings of gender 
equality in the country (Barát). It also clusters these as ideologies 
and practices that jeopardise social stability and the country 
itself. 
                          
 9 Aged 66, married with two children. 
10 Aged 32, married with no children. 
11 Female opposition MP. 
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The growing frustration with which certain ruling MPs 
approach gender equality and its proponents is conveyed through 
the intensity of the words used by the leader of the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party, Péter Harrach12, a theologian by 
training, during a parliamentary debate on 30 September 2013 
over government policy on state funding for families: “Opposition 
ultra-feminists try to depict ruling coalition MPs as boors for 
campaign purposes . . . Christians respect women, as God created 
them in his own image, but they respect mothers even more as it 
[motherhood] is the complete self-fulfilment of womanhood.” In 
Harrach’s discourse, the views of the political opposition are 
conflated with extreme feminism and the opposition itself is 
accused of campaigning over six months before election time. He 
positions Christians—and thus himself and the coalition—in 
contrast to them and confirms the sanctity of motherhood—
endowed by faith—as the complete fulfilment of womanhood. 
Through this logic, he provides a religious explanation to justify 
his claim, one that cannot be challenged lightly, as it becomes a 
matter of belief. 
 
 
The Construction of Proper Womanhood 
 
These examples illustrate particular ideological presumptions 
and changing socio-cultural tendencies encouraged by the 
current political power structure in Hungary. Although reality is 
far more diverse, treating gendered female bodies as comprising a 
homogeneous group and influencing their self-perception and 
particular life choices through discourses, particular policies and 
institutions do impact women’s lives increasingly. Therefore, 
government discourses and policies do matter as they designate 
people’s opportunities, life courses and positions, which are 
different for men and for women. Thus gender does matter.  
Statements made by the ruling coalition in Parliament clearly 
indicate the politicisation of gender: the political elite advocates 
the model of motherhood as the desired example for Hungarian 
women, hearkening back to a model of true womanhood that 
spread in the nineteenth century and confirming gender hierarchy 
with heteronormative masculine power and patriarchy as the 
norm. Unlike this model, however, the current political emphasis 
                          
12 Aged 66, with 3 children. 
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is placed on female reproductive capacity and performance. In 
relation to that, any form of deviation towards a more egalitarian 
gender perspective, from the fundamental belief in the right of 
choice and self-determination to the demand for equal rights and 
recognition, is dismissed as a leftist-liberal project—which is not 
necessarily the case by definition. Moreover, egalitarianism is also 
conflated with the socialist period—when political discourse 
conveyed the idea of complete gender equality, and therefore a 
rejection of that political establishment has often translated into a 
rejection of the era’s “forced emancipation”—as well as with 
foreign, that is, Western, influence—often camouflaged in the 
discourse as feminism. Feminism, in turn, is frequently used with 
an implied characterisation of extremist, man-hating, greedy, 
career-oriented, flamboyant single women who resent marriage 
and refuse to have children, which has long carried a negative 
connotation in mainstream Hungarian society (Acsady and 
Hochberg). Non-conformist women are thus often misrepresented 
as indifferent if not hostile to the current government and thus, to 
the nation, both in political and ethnic terms. 
Due to the overtly vague definition of domesticity, women have 
been, implicitly or explicitly, held responsible for specific social 
problems, such as divorce and homelessness; they therefore often 
appear as the guilty party and as perpetrators. I argue that this is 
partially possible because women are typically discussed as 
separate from men in whatever familial project they are 
associated with. Men tend to be only implied in discourses on 
family, but their role or position is not problematized. This could 
also be observed in connection with the proposition of the 
infertility tax, for example, later referred to as the childless tax, 
which was considered as a potential levy on women.  
Operating as a free floating signifier, motherhood also allows 
for the power structure to change its discourse and momentary 
expectations at will, granting a flexibility to governmental  
and patriarchal rule as well as maintaining the heightened 
psychological zeal in women to perform better. In the meanwhile, 
women are faced with the recognition that whatever they do may 
not be good enough. Moreover, the ruling coalition’s divisive 
discourse can undermine any female solidarity and women’s 
movement—that have emerged only modestly since the regime 
change (Arpad and Marinovich)—and deepen divisions between 
their various groups. Women thus unintentionally re-institute 
and naturalise heteronormativity as well as masculine and 
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patriarchal power positions as part of their “unconscious 
ideological” (Ahall) realm, degrading and marginalising themselves 
and their own sex even further in the midst of the great 
Hungarian national project. 
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